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There is a trend in regulatory practice towards providing dedicated incentives for strategic 
investments. Italy and the United States have the longest experience with authorizing returns and risk-
mitigating incentives that deviate from standard regulatory treatment for policy purposes. In these 
countries, the regulatory incentives are based on a case-by-case assessment of capital projects. We find 
that the Italian scheme is simpler, which reduces administrative costs. The U.S. scheme is more 
advanced in the case-by-case assessment. Even though dedicated incentives may be controversial, our 
analysis of both experiences shows that, notwithstanding significant learning costs, both schemes have 
facilitated substantial financial investment in strategically important infrastructure.  
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The regulatory frameworks that apply to electricity transmission investments predominantly authorize 
comparable returns to all electricity infrastructure projects, irrespective of their costs and benefits, and 
irrespective of their unique risk profiles. Historically, and after vertical separation of transmission, 
there were sound economic reasons to uniformly remunerate all past and new investment in regulated 
asset base (RAB) based on the averaged risk profile of transmission firms (in the US) or transmission 
system operators (TSO) in Europe. Remunerating investment via the RAB constitutes a commitment 
by the regulatory authority so that the investor can recover the costs of past and new investment over 
the whole range of the risk spectrum and transferring much of the investment risk to electricity 
customers (Helm, 2009). Based on its historic success, it is easy to believe that this approach can be 
adapted to implement premium returns on investments that are deemed riskier than average. 
 
In the years following the liberalization, raising the efficiency of the TSOs for the benefit of electricity 
customers became the primary objective in most European countries. This objective lead countries to 
move away from cost-of-service regulation that is more investment friendly by passing on all costs 
and thus most risk to customers, towards the application of incentive-based regulation with an ex ante 
cap on allowed revenues and efficiency targets that put more risk on investors (Brunekreeft and 
Meyer, 2011; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001; Microeconomix, 2008). The increased risk for the TSO will 
not compromise regular investment as long as the risk profile of the investment does not deviate from 
the average risk profile of the firm, which determines the revenue cap. 
 
Today, however, many TSOs face again the need to invest more in strategically important projects that 
support the realization of national and EU energy and climate objectives. Considering that electricity 
markets and grids often cross geopolitical borders, strategic transmission investment is increasingly 
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addressed at the regional level, as seen by the many interstate projects in the U.S.
1
 or by the projects of 




Where there are significant transmission investment needs, regulatory authorities face an important 
question: how can the regulatory framework balance the objectives of incentivizing investment, on the 
one hand, and incentivizing efficiency improvements, on the other? Glachant et al. (2013) argue that in 
the tradeoff between the investment risk and the remuneration of the transmission firm, the national 
regulatory framework should ensure that the remuneration is sufficient for all investment, including 
the investment that is subject to greater cost uncertainty. This approach is fine to the extent that the 
necessary investment is comparable to regular investment. However, it could be less costly to offer 
dedicated incentives only to the strategically important investment, on a case-by-case basis, whereas 
regular investment remains subject to standard regulatory treatment. These dedicated incentives 
comprise a customization of one or more of the main regulatory parameters, which are the length of 
the regulatory period, the return on equity, the specified efficiency targets, and the scope of the 
revenue cap. 
 
This issue has initiated a debate among practitioners in Europe in terms of regulatory policy for 
strategically important investment, especially if the investment has impacts across several countries. It 
could be argued that strategic projects should be dealt with in the same way as regular national 
investment because the standard regulatory treatment sufficiently addresses the risks of strategically 
important projects, or it could be argued that these projects justify dedicated regulatory treatment. The 
European Agency for Collaboration of Energy Regulators has documented all incentives for 
transmission investment that are currently applied in EU Member States (ACER, 2014), finding that 
most countries already foresee several risk mitigating measures. The debate on the two approaches, 
however, is very much open,  
 
More and more countries are experimenting with dedicated regulatory incentives to speed up strategic 
transmission investment. Investment incentives are decided case by case, first deciding on the 
eligibility of a project for dedicated incentives and next deciding on an appropriate incentive package. 
Case-by-case incentives, however, are very controversial as they are often associated with merchant 
investment and their adoption could make it easier for third-party investors to contest the regulated 
monopoly for some projects. Nevertheless, dedicated incentives have been rolled out in several 
countries. In the UK, for instance, several dedicated incentives already exist for the connection of 
offshore wind farms to the mainland (Meeus, 2014) as well as one for interconnectors to speed up EU 
market integration (Meeus and Keyaerts, 2014). France is also in the process of setting up dedicated 
incentives for interconnectors for the same reason. In Germany, large domestic and cross-border grid-
expansion investments that support the German Energiewende are accelerated with dedicated 
incentives for what they consider strategically important investment.  
 
However, the longest and richest experiences with dedicated regulatory incentives for strategic 
transmission investments are,in Italy and the U.S. In the U.S., dedicated incentives have driven an 
estimated $13 billion of commissioned investments in the period 2006-2012 (Lum, 2012), with 
transmission investment steadily increasing after 2005, when the dedicated incentives scheme became 
effective (EEI, 2013, 2016). In Italy, nearly thirty large infrastructure projects, representing billions of 
euro in investment, have been funded through the dedicated incentive scheme (AEEGSI, 2014a, 2014b 
2016; Terna, 2006, 2010, 2014). The contribution of this paper is to analyze the experiences of these 
two countries in detail. We show that even though there are significant learning costs in their 
implementation, dedicated incentives have succeeded in speeding up the implementation of 
strategically important infrastructure projects.
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1
 See, for instance, the respective regional transmission plans in PJM, MISO, CAISO, etc. 
2
 See the 2013 list of projects in Commission delegated Regulation (EU) No 1391/2013 of 14.10.2013 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European 
energy infrastructure as regards the Union list of projects of common interest. (EC, 2013a, 2013b) 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main logic of dedicated regulatory 
incentives through the Italian and U.S. implementation experiences.  In this section we also compare 
the two approaches to provide dedicated incentives, finding that, even though the conceptual designs 
are significantly different, the available evidence suggests that both succeeded in speeding up 
investment. Section 3 describes how both schemes have evolved over time into more sophisticated and 
complex schemes, illustrating the significant learning costs involved. The paper concludes with the 
lessons learned for policy makers and regulatory authorities. 
 
 
2. Dedicated regulatory incentives: comparison of Italy and the US 
 
Dedicated incentives typically follow a two-step logic: (1) limiting access to the dedicated incentives 
to strategically important projects, and (2) offering dedicated incentives to facilitate the 
implementation of those important investments. The two-step logic is illustrated below for the Italian 
and for U.S. regulatory frameworks, respectively. 
 
2.1. Introduction to the Italian experience 
 
The Italian policy makers, led by the Italian national regulatory authority, decided to prioritize 
important expansions of the transmission grid that were deemed necessary to promote competition and 
improve market integration in the aftermath of a countrywide blackout in 2003 (AEEG, 2003, 2005). 
We examine the Italian experience during the fourth regulatory period, which covers 2012-2015 
(AEEG, 2011a, 2011b, 2013a; AEEGSI 2014b). During this period, twenty-five projects received 
dedicated incentives for important transmission investments (AEEG, 2013a; AEEGSI 2014b). Some 
of these projects are under construction or near completion, whereas other projects are at the stage of 
obtaining permits. In what follows, we first discuss the access to this scheme, and then the type of 
dedicated incentives that can be granted under the scheme. 
 
2.1.1. Access to dedicated incentives in Italy 
 
As illustrated in the upper part of Figure 1, the developer submits the proposed project to the Italian 
regulatory authority. The authority then assesses whether the project is either an interconnection that 
connects Italy to neighboring countries, or a domestic transmission line that will reduce internal 
congestion. Both may constitute strategically important investments, given underlying policy 
objectives are increasing market integration and reliability.  
 
Following a positive assessment
4
 of the investment, the project is granted access to the three types of 
dedicated incentives that are discussed below. In case of a negative assessment, the project receives 
the standard regulatory treatment for transmission investment. Any approved project automatically 
exits the dedicated incentive scheme after a predefined period, which is currently after twelve years of 
operational service of the transmission project, which is a significant extension of the standard four-
year length of the regulatory period. It subsequently receives the standard treatment for its remaining 
regulatory lifetime. As the scheme has been initiated in the second regulatory period 2004-2007, the 
earliest such exit, after twelve years, will occur in 2016. 
 
To sum up, access to the dedicated incentives in Italy is limited in time, and also limited by 
predefining eligible project categories, which is relatively simple to administer. The Italian regulatory 
authority for energy AEEG
5
 did not create a specialized department to administer this scheme, and is 




                                                 
4
 Little information could be found on this internal procedure to assess projects. 
5
 As of 2014, AEEG changed its name into AEEGSI to reflect that it also regulates hydro systems. 
6
 Staff numbers of AEEG amounted to approximately 180 at the end of 2013 (http://www.autorita.energia.it). 
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2.1.2. Type of dedicated incentives in Italy 
 
In the Italian scheme, there are three types of dedicated incentives (Figure 1): (1) a premium return on 
investment for completed projects; (2) a premium for work in progress; and (3) a penalty for projects 
exceeding their planned commissioning date. The latter two incentives are voluntary. Developers can 
ask for the additional work in progress incentives, but only if they then also accept being exposed to 
the penalties associated with delays. All three incentives customize the return on investment, whereas 
the latter two incentives also customize the scope of the revenue cap by allowing the inclusion of work 
in progress. 
 
How they are administered is as follows. First, upon completion of a project, a two-percentage point 
increase over the standard return on investment is automatically awarded for twelve years. Second, 
work in progress qualifies for a two-percent premium conditional on making sufficient progress with 
authorization or construction work. Progress is measured through an assessment of annual milestones. 
These milestones are expressed in a monetary value and are set for each project by the regulatory 
authority in agreement with the project developer upon entry into the scheme. Each year, the 
regulatory authority assesses for the aggregated work in progress whether a project developer has met 
at least seventy percent of the accumulated value of the company’s milestones of the previous year. If 
the threshold is met, the project developer gets a two percent premium for all work in progress by 31 
December of the previous year. While there is a case-by-case element in setting the milestones, the 
actual assessment looks only at the aggregated level of all projects of a project developer: about 74 % 
of ongoing investments met their milestones in the first half of 2013 (AEEG, 2013b); more than 90 % 
of ongoing investments met their milestones in the second half of 2013 (AEEGSI, 2014a). The upward 
trend continued for 2014 when more than 97% of the ongoing investments met their milestones, but 
performance dropped
7
 somewhat to about 75% for 2015, which was still above the threshold. Third, if 
the actual commissioning date exceeds the planned date by more than twelve months, the project 
developer must pay a lump sum penalty to the regulatory authority in the amount of two percent 
calculated on 110 % of the invested capital and pro rata of the months that the project is late. 
 
In other words, the dedicated incentives in Italy are, to a large extent, the same for all projects that are 
granted access to the scheme with the exception of projects that do not meet their milestones, and/or 
commissioning dates. There is an element of case-by-case assessment of projects, but it is limited to 
the establishment of milestones and the monitoring of progress. Finally, while the incentives are 




                                                 
7
 The completion of the 380 kV line between Sorgente and Rizziconi did not complete works on time and 
accounted for 17.5 % of the ongoing investments; the project has been inaugurated in May 2016.  
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the dedicated regulatory scheme for strategic electricity transmission 






2.2. Introduction to the U.S. experience  
 
In 2003, the U.S. also faced a large blackout. A task force report following the incident identified the 
failing transmission grid as an aggravating factor (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 
2004). Furthermore, the U.S. had been observing decades of declining transmission investment 
(Benjamin, 2007; Hirst and Kirby, 2001; Hirst, 2004). This led to the conclusion by policy makers that 
additional incentives were necessary for investment in regional reliability projects. Subsequently, in 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which regulates 
transmission based on federal authority for interstate
8
 commerce, was mandated to set up a new 
scheme to promote strategic transmission investment (FERC, 2006b, 2006c, 2012). By 2012, around 
85 applications for entry had been filed, representing billions of U.S. dollar in investment and covering 
more than a hundred infrastructure projects (FERC, 2012). In what follows, we discuss access to this 
scheme and the types of dedicated incentives that can be granted under the scheme. 
 
2.2.1. Access to dedicated incentives in the US 
 
As illustrated in the upper part of Figure 2, the strategic importance of the project is first established 
through case-by-case assessment in the US. There are three ways for a project developer to 
demonstrate the importance of a proposed project. The first is for the project to be included in a 
regional transmission expansion plan
9
 (RTEP) that performs an assessment of the reliability and/or 
congestion impact. In that case, the regulatory authority presumes that the project is indeed important. 
If a project is not included in a RTEP, the project developer can submit alternative evidence such as 
private technical studies to demonstrate the impact on the regional transmission grid. The regulatory 
authority evaluates this evidence and decides whether the project is indeed important or not. The third 
option available to the project developer is to apply for access that is conditional to a pending 
inclusion of the project into the RTEP process. The second step in the entry process is the so-called 
“nexus test”. Project developers have to demonstrate the extraordinary risk of their proposed projects. 
The extraordinary nature of the project can come from the financial size of the project compared to the 
existing assets of the project developer, the innovativeness of the technology, or other practical 
challenges. The regulatory authority has provided further guidance on how to demonstrate 
extraordinary risk in its case-by-case rulings (see section 3).  
 
Following FERC’s positive assessment of the provided evidence, a project can be granted access to as 
many as ten dedicated incentives: (1) a premium return on investment; (2) 100% cost recovery of 
prudently incurred construction work in progress; (3) 100% cost recovery of prudently incurred pre-
construction costs; (4) 100% cost recovery of prudently incurred costs of a stranded project; (5) the 
use of hypothetical capital structures; (6) accumulated deferred income taxes for transmission 
companies; (7) adjustments to book value for sales)purchases; (8) accelerated depreciation; (9) 
deferred cost recovery for utilities with retail rate freezes; and (10) a higher rate of return for utilities 
that join and/or continue to be members of transmission organizations, such as RTOs and ISOs.10  
 
In case of a negative assessment, the project receives the standard treatment for transmission 
investment, i.e., investors get the standard return on investment that has been set for the company. Any 
approved project automatically exits the dedicated incentive scheme after a predefined period, which 
is currently at the end of the regulatory lifetime of the transmission project. FERC will consider 
accelerated depreciation as short as fifteen years
11
 as one of the incentives that can be accessed. As the 
dedicated incentive scheme initiated in 2006, the earliest any strategic investment in the scheme would 
reach the end of its regulatory lifetime is 2021. 
                                                 
8
 Intrastate transmission investment that has no regional impact is under the jurisdiction of state regulators. 
Interstate investment that is not strategically important receives standard ratemaking treatment by FERC. 
9
 A regional transmission expansion plan can be organized by an Independent System Operator (ISO) or a 
Regional Transmission Operator, depending on the local organization of the electricity system. 
10
 An overview is provided on: https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-invest.asp  
11




To sum up, access to the dedicated incentives in the U.S. is limited to the regulatory lifetime of the 
asset, and also controlled by a two-step case-by-case assessment of projects. This can be relatively 
costly to administer for the regulatory authority. However, the burden of proof is on the project 
developers, and the decision is taken at the federal instead of the state level in the US, which reduces 
administrative costs. Still, to implement this scheme, the FERC expanded its staff with a few dozen 




2.2.2. Type of dedicated incentives in the US 
 
Of the ten dedicated incentives in the U.S. scheme
13
; the four that are most used are discussed here 
(Figure 2): (1) a premium return on investment; (2) a 100% cost recovery of work in progress during 
construction; (3) a recovery of pre-construction costs; and (4) 100% cost recovery in the case of a 
stranded project. The first customizes the remuneration of capital, whereas the next two dedicated 
incentives customize the scope of the revenue base. The fourth type of dedicated incentives offers a 
cost pass through in case of investment that subsequently turns out to be inefficient. 
 
How they are administered is as follows. For each incentive requested, the project developer must 
demonstrate with factual evidence that the particular incentive is necessary to proceed with the project. 
A project developer can, for instance, request a premium return on investment to cover the challenges 
of applying an innovative technology to the project. Or a developer can provide evidence of cash-flow 
or financing challenges that can be mitigated with the full recovery of pre-construction costs or the 
inclusion of construction work in progress in the ratebase. If a project is still in the early stages of 
development and is, for example, dealing with several authorities, the developer could also request an 
incentive that allows full recovery of costs in case of a stranded project, where abandonment is beyond 
its control.  
 
The developer also has to demonstrate that the total package of incentives matches the risk of the 
project. There are several rulings by FERC on the regulatory treatment of a project in which the level 
of the requested premium was decreased because other incentives that reduce the project risk had also 
been granted. In other words, dedicated incentives for transmission in the U.S. are strongly dependent 
on an assessment of project risk and the evidence presented by the project developer. The U.S. scheme 
therefore has three elements of case-by-case assessment: (1) strategic importance, (2) project risk, and 
(3) the appropriateness of the proposed package of dedicated incentives relative to project risk. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 According to its annual budget requests (FERC, 2006a, 2007a, 2008a), FERC requested +25 full time 
equivalents for fiscal year 2007, +75 for 2008 and +65 for 2009 dedicated – at least in part – to the 
implementation of the competences laid out in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
13
 Snarr (2007) and Daileader (2007) are two authors that have previously discussed these incentives. 
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Figure 2: Flowchart of the dedicated regulatory scheme for strategic electricity transmission 





2.3. Comparison of the Italian and the U.S. experience 
 
 
Commonalities of the experiences 
 
The contexts in which the Italian and U.S. schemes to provide dedicated regulatory incentives for 
strategic electricity transmission investments have been developed are very similar. In both cases, a 
blackout triggered the change in regulatory practice, based on a perception of lacking transmission 
investment under standard regulatory treatment. The two approaches have in common that they control 
the costs of the scheme by limiting access to the dedicated incentives. They also have in common that 
the incentives are not necessarily the same for all projects and that the incentives are a package of 
measures focused on either reducing the risk to project developers or increasing their return on 
investment.  
 
Differences between the experiences 
 
There are also clear differences between the Italian and the U.S. experiences. The U.S. scheme is more 
advanced in the case-by-case assessment of the requested incentives. As discussed above, there are 
three assessment steps encompassing strategic importance, project risk, and appropriateness of 
dedicated incentives. The incentive package in the U.S. is more advanced. FERC considers a wider 
scope of the risk and return on investments and can be adapted to each project. In comparison, the 
Italian scheme is simpler, using the type of project as a proxy for its strategic importance and granting 
a premium return on investment, regardless of project-specific risks. Because of its simplicity, the 
Italian scheme is less costly to administer. The higher costs of the U.S. scheme, however, are borne at 
federal level allowing some economies of scale to be captured. A comparable scheme for Europe 
might be to have the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) perform case-by-case 
assessments of international projects of common interest. 
 
Outcomes following the dedicated incentives 
 
Despite the differences, both the Italian and the U.S. experience suggest that dedicated incentives are 
successful in committing investment to strategically important projects.  
 
In Italy, up to 2016, nearly thirty strategically important projects had been or are being implemented, 
at a value of several billion euro. Among the projects covered by the dedicated regulatory scheme are 
cross-border interconnections to France and to Montenegro, ten major 380 kV transmission lines in the 
north and the south regions of Italy, several reinforced connections to the Italian isles, and the 
refurbishment and streamlining of the transmission networks in metropolitan areas such as Milan, 
Torino, Napoli and Palermo (AEEGSI, 2014a, 2016; Terna, 2012). 
 
In the United States, between 2006 and 2012, several dozen projects valued at more than $13 billion 
were approved and commissioned under FERC’s dedicated incentive scheme (Lum, 2012).
14
 
Furthermore, it was estimated that an additional $23 billion of already approved
15
 investment would be 
commissioned by 2016. Moreover, a notable increase in the amount of capital invested into the 
transmission system coincides with the implementation of the dedicated regulatory scheme as 
illustrated in Figure 4. Notable examples are the Energy Gateway project that is adding over 2000 
miles of transmission lines in the Pacific region (EEI, 2016; Pacificorp, 2016); thirty-six projects by 
Virginia Electric Power to revamp the transmission grid in the Virginia-Maryland area (Dominion, 
                                                 
14
 For an overview of the FERC decisions see: http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-invest.asp. 
15
 Some of these investments have meanwhile been commissioned such as the $2.5 billion Tehachapi renewable 
transmission project by Southern California Edison that was included in the scheme in 2007 and was 
commissioned in December 2016, whereas other investments have been delayed such as the $1.6 billion 
RITEline project that was accepted in the scheme on the strict (suspending) condition that it had to be included 
in the regional transmission plan of PJM, which had not yet happened by the end of 2016.  
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2016; EEI, 2016); twenty-five projects by Southern California Edison, worth more than $4.5 billion 
(EEI, 2015; Southern California Edison, 2016); and the more than $1 billion Grand Rivers project by 
Ameren in the Missouri-Illinois area (EEI, 2015). 
 
This available evidence is in line with the findings of Brunekreeft and Borrmann (2011), who argue 
that regulatory frameworks that combine elements of cost-of-service and incentive-based regulation 
are able to accelerate investment, citing the premium return on transmission investment provided by 
regulators in Italy and the United States. 
 
Figure 3: historic transmission investment in Italy 2004-2013 (million euro, nominal) (source: 
AEEGSI, 2015qqq 464-15) 
 
 
Figure 4: Historic transmission investment in the U.S. 1984-2015 (million U.S. dollar, nominal) (data 





3. Learning costs involved in dedicated incentives 
 
In this section, we illustrate the significant learning costs involved in implementing dedicated 
incentives. We first discuss how the Italian regulatory practice evolved across regulatory periods to 
arrive its current design, and then how the U.S. regulatory practice evolved based on a series of key 
cases.  
. 
3.1. Evolution of the Italian regulatory practice across regulatory periods  
 
Italy started with dedicated regulatory incentives for strategic transmission investments in 2004 during 
the second period of the regulatory framework. The initial setup did not include a case-by-case 
element, but this was introduced in the third regulatory period and fine-tuned in the fourth regulatory 
period. 
 
Second regulatory period: no case-by-case assessments 
11 
 
Initially, during the second regulatory period, the dedicated regulatory incentive scheme in Italy 
operated without case-by-case project assessments. Important transmission investment was 
remunerated two percentage points more than regular investment and this increased return on 
investment was granted for twelve years upon the project being approved by the Ministry of Industry 
(AEEG, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2007b). This approval formed the only level of assessment, but it is 
unclear on what basis the ministry granted approval. 
 
Third regulatory period: start of case-by-case assessments 
Important changes were introduced to the framework before the start of the third regulatory period 
2008-2011 (AEEG, 2007a, 2007b). Regarding the access to the investment incentives, there were two 
important changes. First, the regulatory authority for energy, AEEG, was put in charge of controlling 
the access of projects to the scheme. Second, project categories were introduced to determine the 
eligibility of a project for dedicated incentives.  
 
Regarding the types of incentives that can be granted under the scheme, there were two important 
changes. First, the return on investment premium was increased to three percentage points. Second, the 
regulatory authority introduced an acceleration incentive for work in progress (AEEG, 2007b). This 
acceleration incentive granted a three percent premium for construction work in progress in 
combination with a requirement to meet the planned commissioning date (AEEG, 2008). In case of a 
delay, the project developer had to return the premium received for work in progress, whereas in the 
case of early commissioning the premium return on investment was extended beyond twelve years by 
the number of months that the project was early.  
 
By the end of the third regulatory period, the regulatory authority observed that the implementation 
pace of important projects was still slow (AEEG, 2010a). The existing acceleration mechanism was 
clarified by separating the incentive for work in progress from the incentive for timely commissioning. 
This also led to the introduction of new tools to administer the incentives. Milestones with a 70% 
threshold were introduced to administer the work in progress incentive. These incentives, as discussed 
above and still implemented today, were tested for the first time in 2010 and 2011 on 22 important 
transmission projects admitted into the scheme (AEEG, 2010b, 2011a, 2012).  
 
Fourth regulatory period: the fine-tuning of case-by-case assessments 
Most of the changes introduced during the third regulatory period were confirmed for further use 
during the fourth regulatory period, 2012-2015. The premium return on investment for completed 
projects continues to be granted automatically without case-by-case assessment, but the level of the 
premium was reduced again to two percentage points on top of the standard remuneration (AEEG, 
2011b, 2011c). The new work-in-progress incentives and new incentives for delayed projects were 
also continued, but remained voluntary. 
 
The number of projects admitted into the scheme during the fourth regulatory period that opted in on 
all incentives rose to twenty-five projects, with some of the projects being carried over from the 
previous period (AEEG, 2013a; AEEGSI, 2014b). 
 
Fifth regulatory period: transition towards output based incentives 
The new rules for the fifth regulatory period, 2016-2023 (AEEGSI, 2015a, 2015b), confirmed the 
existing commitments to projects that started in the previous regulatory periods. For new projects, 
however, new rules move towards output based incentives. In a transitory period, a premium return on 
investment of one percentage point for twelve years can still be granted to projects under two 
cumulative conditions. The first condition requires that significant project expenditure upwards of 
twenty-five percent of the expected costs had to have occurred by the end of 2015, meaning that the 
project was well underway during the fourth regulatory period. The second requirement to be eligible 
for the transitory scheme is that the project must be included in the annual transmission development 
plan of 2017 at the latest and it must be commissioned by 2019.  
 




The U.S. started implementing dedicated regulatory incentives for strategic transmission investments 
in 2006 through FERC Orders 679 and 679-A (FERC, 2006b, 2006c). Here we discuss some of the 
key cases that have gradually clarified the case-by-case assessment of strategic importance, project 
risk, and appropriateness of dedicated incentives.  
 
Key cases for the assessment of project importance 
In a case involving Duquesne Light Company (FERC, 2007b), FERC made a distinction between eight 
projects included in a Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) for which the reliability impact 
had been evaluated and fourteen projects that were mentioned in a RTEP without such an evaluation. 
The eight projects were presumed to be important based on their inclusion in the RTEP, whereas the 
latter fourteen were only admitted conditionally pending the company’s submission of sufficient 
evidence of their importance.  
 
In a ruling involving Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (FERC, 2007c) FERC accepted the 
developer’s private technical studies on the reliability impact as evidence of project importance. FERC 
has referred back to this key ruling to illustrate the type of evidence that can be used to demonstrate 
the importance of a transmission project. 
 
In the rulings involving Tallgrass Transmission & Prairie Wind Transmission (FERC, 2008d) and 
Ameren (FERC, 2011), FERC reconfirmed that inclusion in a RTEP is not a prerequisite for entry into 
the dedicated incentive scheme and granted provisional entry into the scheme pending full approval in 
a later stage. The regulator further clarified that granting entry, conditional or full, did not imply 
automatic inclusion in an ongoing RTEP process, which is the sole prerogative of the regional 
transmission operator.  
 
Key cases for the assessment of extraordinary project risk 
In the ruling involving Duquesne Light Company (FERC, 2007b), FERC accepted factual evidence 
showing that the project was challenging for the developer in terms of financing, permitting and 
technology. The regulator found that the evidence sufficiently demonstrated the extraordinary risk of 
the project. 
 
In a case involving Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (FERC, 2007c), FERC established a practice 
to assess the risk of a project by proxy, inquiring whether a project was “routine” or “non-routine”. 
The ruling provided further guidance about what arguments FERC would consider for qualifying a 
project as non-routine, such as the size of the project, the impact of the project on the regional market, 
and the challenges faced by the project. Even though this assessment by proxy considers project risk, it 
does not evaluate whether the risk is extraordinary and thus warrants dedicated investment incentives. 
 
In cases involving Westar (FERC, 2008b) and Pepco (FERC, 2008c), FERC had to decide whether or 
not to evaluate several submitted projects as a single project. The regulator declined to view the three 
projects in Westar as a single project, and subsequently found that two projects were unable to 
demonstrate extraordinary risk. The eight projects submitted in the Pepco filing, however, were 
accepted as a single project, meaning that the developer could demonstrate the riskiness at the 
aggregated level. In a cases involving the PJM Interconnection (FERC, 2009), FERC further explored 
the issue of grouped projects, stating that multiple projects can be submitted as a single project if there 
is supporting evidence of the interactions among the individual projects, adding another level of case-
by-case assessment. The regulator also stated that multiple projects may be submitted as individual 
projects in a single application filing. In that case, the project developer must demonstrate the 
importance and risk of each project separately. 
 
In 2012, FERC abandoned the assessment by proxy established in Baltimore Gas & Electric Company 
(FERC, 2012). The newly introduced regulatory approach relies on a full case-by-case assessment of 





Key cases for the connection between risk and incentives 
In the ruling on Duquesne Light Company (FERC, 2007b), FERC granted a return premium that was 
lower than requested, indicating that the project’s risk was already partly mitigated with other granted 
incentives. In that same ruling, the regulator clarified what factual evidence it would consider when 
deciding to grant the full cost recovery of construction work in progress by inclusion of these costs in 
the RAB.  
 
In the ruling on Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (FERC, 2007c), FERC granted the requested 
return premium for only two out of eight projects that entered the scheme, rejecting the premium for 
the other six projects based on their different risk profile. Furthermore, the regulator rejected the 
request for 100% cost recovery of construction work in progress on the grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence that the incentive was necessary to implement the project.  
 
In Tallgrass Transmission & Prairie Wind Transmission (FERC, 2008d), the granted return premium 
was lower than the level requested by the project developer because the allegedly innovative 
technology had been recognized as mature technology in other rulings by the regulator. 
 
FEERC decided to expand the scope of the case-by-case assessments in its 2012 policy statement 
(FERC, 2012), requiring project developers to demonstrate what they have done to manage project 
risk, including their requests for risk-mitigating incentives, before applying for a premium return on 
investment. In the cases submitted after the 2012 policy statement, few requests were made for a 
premium return on investment, whereas this was standard practice before the policy statement. 
 
4. Conclusions and policy implications  
 
Although still controversial, more and more countries, including Germany, France, Great Britain, and 
the Netherlands, are applying or considering case-by-case dedicated incentives for strategic investment 
in electricity transmission infrastructure. Italy (since 2004) and the United States (since 2006) have the 
longest experience as detailed and compared in this paper. While the experiences in Italy and the 
United States do not provide definitive evidence that dedicated incentives schemes are appropriate for 
strategic investments, the available evidence of the respective schemes illustrates that both served the 
purpose for which they were implemented: accelerating strategically important investment in the 
transmission grid. To gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics between the regulatory parameters 
and new investments, empirical analysis is recommended. 
 
Notwithstanding the apparently positive experiences in Italy and the United States, there also has been 
significant learning to reduce administrative costs and improve cost efficiency. Over time, both 
schemes have evolved towards more sophisticated models. In the United States, the federal regulator 
has clarified its scheme in a series of key decisions. In Italy, the regulatory authority started with a 
relatively simpler scheme of granting the same dedicated incentives to all investment classified as 
strategically important. Over the course of three regulatory periods, Italy’s scheme was fine-tuned to 
increase the cost efficiency of the scheme. For instance, the premium return on investment was made 
conditional on the sufficient progress of the project, which was monitored via predefined milestones. 
 
More sophistication, of course, also implies more complexity for the project developers that must 
apply for the dedicated incentives and the regulatory authorities that must administer the process. In 
the United States, the burden of proof is on the project developers who must demonstrate that their 
request for dedicated incentives is justified by extraordinary project risk. In Italy, the complexity is 
limited to the establishment and monitoring of project milestones for work-in-progress incentives, and 
to administer the possible penalty for delayed commissioning of the project. 
 
The apparent success in Italy and the United States do not necessarily mean that all countries should 
follow their examples and provide dedicated incentives for strategically important investments within 
their regulatory frameworks on a case-by-case basis. Some countries might argue that the 
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administrative costs are too high, particularly relative to benefits. For countries that implement a 
dedicated incentive scheme, it is important to consider the learning costs involved for all concerned 
parties, including regulatory authorities, project developers and investors. The final objective of the 
regulatory scheme remains to achieve a high quality service to final customers at the lowest cost 





The authors are grateful to Marco La Cognata and Paolo Terzilli who have been so kind to check our 
understanding of the Italian regulation for transmission investment. 
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